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Abstract 
 
One of the more puzzling results in the expectations hypothesis (EH) testing 
literature is the Campbell-Shiller paradox.  In an influential paper, Campbell 
and Shiller (1991) found that “the slope of the term structure almost always 
gives a forecast in the wrong direction for the short-term change in the yield 
on the longer bond, but gives a forecast in the right direction for long-term 
changes in short rates.” This paper provides an econometric resolution to the 
Campbell-Shiller paradox. Specifically, it shows that, by their construction, 
these tests can generate results consistent with the Campbell-Shiller paradox 
if the EH does not hold—whatever the reason.  Monte Carlo experiments 
confirm that this explanation can account for Campbell and Shiller’s 
paradoxical results for most pairings of short-term and long-term rates 
considered. 
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1. Introduction 
The expectations hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of interest rates is the 
proposition that the long-term rate is determined by the market’s expectation for the short-
term rate over the holding period of the long-term asset, plus a constant risk premium.  The 
EH, which asserts that expected excess returns are time invariant, plays an important role 
in economics and finance, especially in monetary policy analyses.  Hence, it is not 
surprising that the EH has been painstakingly investigated.  One of the more troubling 
results in the literature is the Campbell-Shiller paradox (CSP).  In their influential work, 
Campbell and Shiller (1991) found that, while the EH was nearly always rejected, the 
results differed markedly depending on the test used.  One of these tests, which I call the 
conventional test because of its frequent use, regresses the long-term change in the short-
term rate on the spread between the long-term and short-term rates.  The EH is tested by 
testing the hypothesis that the slope coefficient, β, equals 1—its theoretical value if the EH 
holds.  While the EH is frequently rejected, estimates of β are typically positive and 
significantly different from zero.  Moreover, estimates of  R
2 are frequently significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that the slope of the yield curve has predictive power for 
the short-term rate. 
The other test, which I call the contrarian test because of its well-documented 
tendency to generate results contrary to the EH, regresses the short-term change in the 
long-term rate on the rate spread.  Estimates of the slope coefficient, λ, (which should also 
equal 1 if the EH holds) are frequently negative, and estimates of R
2 are often 
insignificantly different from zero.  Hence, the rate spread not only suggests the “wrong” 
direction for the short-term change in the long-term rate, but it explains virtually none of it. 
  2Campbell and Shiller (1991, p. 505) concluded that 
We thus see an apparent paradox: the slope of the term structure 
almost always gives a forecast in the wrong direction for the short-
term change in the yield on the longer bond, but gives a forecast in 
the right direction for long-term changes in short rates. 
 
There have been a number of attempts to generate models of the term structure that 
are consistent with the observation that the slope of the term structure almost always gives 
forecasts the wrong direction for the short-term change in the long-term rate, but in the 
right direction for the long-term change in the short-term rate by attributing the failure of 
the EH to a specific cause—e.g., the EH holds but, (i) the risk premium is time-varying, 
(ii) expectations are not rational, (iii) the long-term rate over-reacts to expected changes in 
the short-term rate, etc., (e.g., Fama, 1984; Mankiw and Miron, 1986; Backus, et al., 1989; 
Froot, 1989; Simon, 1990; Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Hardouvelis, 1994; McCallum, 
1994a; Campbell, 1995; Dotsey and Otrok, 1995; Roberds et al., 1996; Balduzzi, et al. 
1997; Bekaert et al., 1997, 2001; Hsu and Kugler, 1997; Tzavalis and Wickens, 1997; 
Driffill et al., 1997; Roberds and Whiteman, 1999; Bansal and Zhou, 2002; and Dai and 
Singleton, 2002). 
The desire to attribute the CSP to a specific failure of the EH is understandable.  
Clearly, long-term financial markets must be forward looking, so there must be some sense 
in which the long-term rate is determined by the market’s expectation for the future level 
of rates.  Ideally, the rejection of the EH would be attributed to a single cause.  
Nevertheless, in its desire to account for the CSP, the literature has overlooked a relatively 
simple, econometric resolution of the CSP—namely, that these tests are capable of 
generating results that are consistent with the CSP when the EH does not hold whatever the 
reason.  This agnostic approach answers the question: Why does the conventional test 
  3generate estimates that appear favorable to the EH, while the contrarian test (applied to the 
same data) generates results that are completely at odds with it?  This is the essence of the 
CSP.  Moreover, because the EH is nearly always rejected, it resolves the CSP is a manner 
that is consistent with the literature itself.  Unfortunately, the broader question of the why 
EH does not hold remains unresolved. 
Knowing that these tests generate results that are consistent with the CSP when the 
EH does not hold has implications for applied work.  First, knowing that the estimate of β 
is no more reliable an indicator of the validity of the EH than the estimate of λ is evidence 
against it, researchers will be careful not to use the magnitude of the estimate of β (or the 
corresponding estimate of  R
2) as an indicator of the validity of the EH, as has been done 
(e.g., Mankiw and Miron, 1986; Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Roberds et al., 1996; 
Balduzzi et al., 1997; Tzavalis and Wickens, 1997; Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001).  This 
implication applies to tests of other financial theories based on similar equations (e.g., 
Campbell and Shiller, 1987; McCallum, 1994b; Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000).
1
Second, these results will hopefully focus attention away from using these single 
equation tests of the EH and stimulate the use of alternative tests of the EH, such as the 
multivariate test proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1987), which has been made 
operational recently by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001).  This methodology tests the 
restrictions implied by the EH on a general vector autoregression (VAR) representation of 
the short-term and long-term rates.  This test is more difficult to employ than the single 
equation tests that generate the CSP; however, because the VAR encompasses a wider 
array of alternative hypotheses than single equation tests derived under the null, it should 
                                                           
1 Because of its tendency to predict the wrong direction for the short-term change in the long-term rate, 
researchers never based their conclusions about the EH on the estimate of λ. 
  4be more powerful.  Moreover, the test can be applied to a VAR with more than two interest 
rates or that includes other economic variables which might condition market expectations. 
It can also test the EH under the assumptions that interest rates are either stationary or non-
stationary. 
Third, knowing that by their construction these tests frequently generate the CSP 
results when the EH does not hold for any reason will refocus the attention away from 
explaining the CSP to explaining why the EH does not hold.  Hence, rather than positing a 
particular failure of the EH and investigating whether this failure can account for the CSP, 
as much of the literature has done, the focus will hopefully shift to alternative ways to 
investigate why the EH does not hold.  For example, since the predictability of the “short-
term interest rate” is the essence of the EH, researchers might investigate why interest rates 
are difficult to predict (e.g., Diebold and Li, 2003; and Duffee, 2002). 
The resolution of the CSP presented here is motivated by the observation that 
estimates of β and λ need not be zero when the EH does not hold.  Indeed, the estimate of 
β is positively biased—biased above zero—when the EH does not hold, while the estimate 
of λ is negatively biased.  While the analysis presented here has implications for the power 
of these tests, the power of these tests is not the issue.  Indeed, as we will see, these tests 
have relatively high power, at least in the cases covered by the experiment done here. 
The extent to which these features of these tests account for the CSP is investigated 
by a Monte Carlo experiment.  Specifically, a VAR for all combinations of short-term and 
long-term rates used by Campbell and Shiller (1991) is estimated by imposing restrictions 
that guarantee that the EH does not hold.  Hypothetical long- and short-term interest rates 
are generated from this VAR and the conventional and contrarian tests are applied to these 
  5hypothetical data.  The results obtained using the actual data are then compared with the 
distributions of the estimates of β and λ obtained from 10,000 replications of the model.  
The results indicated that, for most combinations of long-term and short-term rates, 
estimates of β and λ obtained from the historical data could have been obtained by 
applying these tests to data for which the EH does not hold. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 derives the conventional and 
contrarian tests and demonstrates the CSP by applying these tests to an updated sample of 
the data used by Campbell and Shiller (1991).  Previous resolutions of the CSP are 
discussed briefly in Section 3.  Section 4 presents an alternative resolution of the CSP.  
Section 5 investigates the extent to which this resolution accounts for the results presented 
in Section 2.  The conclusions and implications are presented in Section 6. 
2. The Conventional and Contrarian Tests of the EH 
The EH of the term structure is a proposition about the relationship between a long-
term, n-period interest rate,  , and expected future levels of a short-term, m-period rate, 
, n-m = (k-1)m periods in the future, where k = n/m is an integer.  That is,  
Rt
n
Rt
m
1 ,
0 (1/ ) (1)
k nm n m
tt t m i i RkE R π
−
+ = =+ . ∑  
Equation 1 states that the n-period rate is equal to the average of the market’s expectation 
for the m-period rate over the term of the n-period rate.  The constant risk premium, 
, nm π , 
may vary with the maturity of the long-term and short-term rates.
2
Both the conventional and contrarian tests are derived under the assumptions that 
the EH is the true data generating process (DGP) and expectations are rational, i.e., 
  6, 0,1,..., 1 (2)
mm
t t mi t mi t mi ER R i k ν ++ + =+ = − ,
    
where  mi t+ ν  is a mean-zero, iid white noise error.  The conventional test is derived by 
substituting (2) into (1) to yield 
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The EH could be tested by rearranging (3) and paramertizing, i.e., 
11
00 (1/ ) (1/ ) (4)
kk mn n
tm i t t tm i ii kR R Rkv αβ
−−
++ == ′ −= + − , ∑∑  
and testing the hypothesis that  ′ = β 0.  This is seldom done, however, because interest 
rates are unit-root or, perhaps more correctly, near-unit-root processes.
3  Rather, the 
conventional test is obtained by subtracting the short-term rate from both sides (3), which 
yields 
4 1 ,
0 (1/ ) ( ) (5)
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−
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The conventional test of the expectations theory is then obtained by parameterizing (5), 
which yields 
1
0 (1/ ) ( ) (6)
k mm n m
tm i t t t t i kR R R R αβ ω
−
+ = −= + − + . ∑  
The EH is tested by estimating (6) and testing the hypothesis β =1. 
To see the implications of the EH for the expected short-term change in the long-
term rate, note that (1) can be rewritten as 
, () (
nm n m n m
tt m t t nm E R n R m R n π
−
+ −= + + . 7 )
                                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
2 Shiller et al., (1983) argue that Equation 1 is exact in some special cases and that it can be derived as a 
linear approximation to a number of nonlinear expectations theories of the term structure. 
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n −  from both sides of (7) and a little algebra yields 
, ( /( ))( ) ( /( )) (8)
nm n n m n m
tt m t t t ER R m n m R R n n m π
−
+ −= − − + − .
 
Again, assuming (2) and parameterizing the resulting expression yields the contrarian test 
of the EH, i.e.,  
( /( ))( ) (9)
nm n n m
tm t t t t RR m n m R R µλ η
−
+ −= + − − + .  
The EH is tested by estimating (9) and testing the hypothesis λ =1. 
2.1 The CSP 
Campbell and Shiller (1991) obtained their paradoxical results by estimating (6) 
and (9) using continuously compounded yields on riskless pure discount bonds, calculated 
by McCulloch (1990) over the period 1952.01 to 1987.02.
4  The maturity of the bonds 
range form 1 to 120 months and the tests were applied to all combinations of rates where k 
is an integer.  The CSP is replicated here using an update of these data (McCulloch and 
Kwon, 1993) for the period 1952.01 to 1991.02. 
The results for the conventional and contrarian tests are reported in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively.  Each cell of the tables reports the estimate of the slope coefficient, the 
estimate of R
2, and the significance levels for Wald test of the null hypotheses that the 
slope coefficients equal   and 1, respectively. 0
5  The results are very similar to those 
reported by Campbell and Shiller (1991) for the sample period 1952.01 to 1987.02. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 An exception is Longstaff (2000). 
4 Similar results are obtained for a variety of countries, data sets and time periods (e.g., Fama, 1984; Mankiw 
and Miron, 1986; Hardouvelis, 1988 and 1994; Simon, 1990; Campbell, 1995; Roberds, et al., 1996; Bekaert 
et al., 1997; Roberds and Whiteman, 1999). 
5 The standard errors are based on the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) method. However, there were three instances 
where the estimated variances were negative.  In these three instances, the Newey-West (1987) method was 
used.  It is well known that the Hansen-Hodrick and Newey-West procedures can generate misleading results 
when the degree of overlap is large relative to the sample size, and the Wald test may be poorly sized.  These 
statistics are used here because they are commonly reported statistics in applied work. 
  8In all but one instance, the estimate of β  is positive and, in the majority of cases, 
estimates of β are significantly different from zero.  Moreover, as was the case with 
Campbell and Shiller (1991), estimates of β  are greater than 1 when the long-term rate is 
the ten-year rate and the EH is easily rejected at the shorter end of the term structure, but 
less frequently at the longer end.  For a given maturity of the short-term rate, estimates of 
β  are larger at the short and long ends of the maturity spectrum and smaller in the 
intermediate range.  This is what Campbell and Shiller and others have characterized as a 
“U-shape” pattern in the estimates of β or what Roberds and Whiteman (1999) term the 
“smile.”  This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the estimate of β for each 
long-term rate for m .  Such results were interpreted as suggesting that the EH works 
better at the short and long ends of the maturity spectrum and less well in the intermediate 
maturity range (e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1991, and Campbell, 1995). 
=1
Estimates of λ , presented in Table 2, are again similar to those reported by 
Campbell and Shiller (1991).  There is a preponderance of “wrong signs” in estimates of 
λ.  Indeed, estimates of λ are negative for every combination of long-term and short-term 
rates save two—0.003 and 3.581 when   is   and  , respectively. ( , ) nm ( , ) 2 1 ( , ) 120 60
6  In 
addition, with the exceptions of n =120, the estimates of R
2 suggest that the rate spread 
explains virtually none of the short-term change in the long-term rate.  For nearly every 
rate pair, the hypothesis λ =1 is rejected at a low significance level.  Moreover, for a given 
value of m, estimates of λ tend to become more negative as n increases.  Roberds and 
Whiteman (1999) refer to this pattern as the “smirk.”  The smirk is illustrated in Figure 2, 
which shows the estimate of λ for each long-term rate for m =1. 
                                                           
6 Campbell and Shiller’s estimates of λ for the shorter sample were 0.002 and 4.575. 
  93. Previous Resolutions of the CSP 
There have been numerous attempts to attribute one or both of these paradoxical 
results to a specific violation of the EH.  Perhaps the most common candidate is a time-
varying risk premium.  It is easy to show that if the risk premium is time varying (rather 
than constant as the EH hypothesizes) and positively correlated with the slope of the yield 
curve, estimates of β and λ will both be biased downward from their theoretical value of 
1.  Hardouvelis (1994), however, argues that the time-varying risk premium is implausible 
and inconsistent with his evidence on its relative variability.  He concludes that the time-
varying risk premium explanation cannot account for the negative estimates of λ reported 
for U.S. data.  He suggests instead that the “overreaction hypothesis” of Campbell and 
Shiller (1991) and Froot (1989) is a more likely explanation.   
The overreaction hypothesis asserts that the long-term rate overreacts to expected 
changes in the short-term rate.  For example, when some event causes the market to raise 
its expectation for the future short-term rate, the long-term rate overreacts causing the 
current spread between the long-term and short-term rate to increase by an amount that is 
larger than is warranted by future changes in the short-term rate.  Hence, over time, the 
long-term rate falls as short-term rate rises.  This creates negative correlation between both 
short-term changes in the long-term rate and long-run changes in the short-term rate and 
the yield spread.  The negative bias in estimates of λ is magnified by the fact that the yield 
spread in (9) is weighted by (mnm /( ) − ), so the bias is larger, the larger the difference in 
maturity between the long-term and short-term rates. 
The overreaction hypothesis is supported by Froot (1989), who used survey data 
and found that the negative correlation between short-term changes in the long-term rate 
  10and the yield spread are not the result of a time-varying risk premium, but are due to a 
violation of the rational expectations assumption.  Hardouvelis (1994) also finds that the 
overreaction hypothesis is a better explanation of the contrarian test anomalies than several 
alternatives, including a time-varying risk premium. 
Bekaert et al. (2001) investigated the possibility that the term structure anomalies 
are the result of a rational version of the overreaction hypothesis.  Specifically, they 
investigate whether these anomalies are the result of a “peso problem,” where high-
interest-rate regimes occur less frequently than rationally anticipated.  Combining their 
peso problem with a time-varying risk premium they are able to generate results that are 
“more consistent with the data.”  They conclude, however, that their model “cannot fully 
account for U.S. term structure anomalies.”
7
Balduzzi et al. (1997) suggest that the rejection of the EH is due to the market’s 
inability to predict monetary-policy-induced changes in short-term rates.  They find that 
accounting for this possibility results in a larger estimate of β, but the EH is rejected.  No 
attempt was made to account for the negative estimates of λ. 
Campbell (1995) suggests that the CSP anomalies can be explained by “changing 
rational expectations about excess long bond returns.”  When the yield spread is “high,” 
market participants must either expect the yield on long-term bonds to be higher over its 
life than that of a series of short-term bonds, or they must expect short-term rates to rise.  
The EH rules out the former, i.e., the yield spread only reflects rationally anticipated 
changes in short-term rates.  Hence, Campbell (1995) argues that changing rational 
expectations of excess long-bond returns acts as a measurement error (e.g., Hardouvelis, 
1994; Stambaugh, 1988), biasing the estimates of both β and λ. Because changing rational 
  11expectations of excess long-bond returns affects both sides of (9)—positively on the rhs 
and negatively on the lhs—the downward bias in the estimate of λ may be severe, causing 
the coefficient to be negative. 
In contrast, the changing rational expectations of excess long-bond returns only 
affects the rhs of (6); hence, the bias will be less severe depending, of course, on the 
correlation between excess long-bond returns and long-term changes in the short-term rate.  
Indeed, if this correlation were negative, the estimates of β would be biased upward.  
Campbell suggests that the combination of predictable policy actions at short horizons 
(e.g., Balduzzi et al., 1997), policymakers’ incentive to make short-term rates predictable 
at long horizons (Goodfriend, 1991, Rudebusch, 1995 and Woodford, 2001), and interest 
rate smoothing in the “medium run” may account for the smile illustrated in Figure 1. 
The interest rate smoothing explanation for the failure of the EH using (3) was first 
suggested by Mankiw and Miron (1986).  They argued that the Fed’s penchant for 
smoothing short-term interest rates accounts for both the well-documented decline in the 
predictability of changes in short-term interest rates and the smaller estimate of β shortly 
after the Fed’s founding. 
There have been several attempts to account for the CSP anomalies using affine 
models of the term structure.  Roberds and Whiteman (1999) worked out the implications 
of a one-factor model of the term structure developed by Cox et al. (1985) and Chen and 
Scott (1992, 1993) for the ability of the yield spread to predict future interest rates.  They 
show that explaining the CSP in this model requires the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the term premium to the standard deviation of forecast changes in the short or long rates to 
be only slightly larger then unity—considerably smaller than Hardouvelis’ (1994) estimate 
                                                                                                                                                                                
7 Bekaert et al. (2001, p. 241). 
  12of 31.7 for the United States.  Nevertheless, they found that certain parameterizations of a 
two-factor model were broadly consistent with the CSP.  Unfortunately, the parameter 
estimates were inconsistent with maximum likelihood estimates reported by Chen and 
Scott (1993) and the hypothetical data generated from these models were inconsistent with 
many of the features of the historical data.  Their findings are consistent with those of 
Backus et al. (1989) and Bansal and Zhou (2002).  Bansal and Zhou conclude that such 
models, including affine specifications with up to three factors, “are sharply rejected by the 
data.”  They found, however, that their two-factor regime shift model—with a regime-
dependent risk premium—could account for negative estimates of λ, though not the smirk 
per se.
8
In a similar vein, Dai and Singleton (2002) and Tzavalis and Wickens (1997) show 
that elements of the CSP can be resolved by allowing sufficient flexibility in capturing the 
time-varying risk.  Dai and Singleton accomplish this by showing that the typical estimates 
of λ can be explained by a large subclass of dynamic term structure models that allow for 
flexibility in the specification of the market price of risk.  Tzavalis and Wickens, on the 
other hand, assume that the term premiums associated with different maturities are 
determined by a common factor.  Both Dai and Singleton and Tzavalis and Wickens show 
that when their estimate of the risk premium is included in (9), the estimate of λ is 
insignificantly different from unity.
9
With the exception of these statistical models that are flexible enough to capture 
much of the observed variation in the term premiums, the literature has not been successful 
                                                           
8 While their estimates of λ were negative for all of the combinations of long-term and short-term rates 
considered, their estimates were frequently very different from the estimates obtained using the historical 
data. 
  13in explaining the CSP.  Indeed, Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) note that “the literature has 
had surprisingly little success generating risk premiums that explain the empirical 
evidence.”
10
4. Resolving the CSP 
Economic data are generated by an unknown DGP.  Economists develop models of 
these DGPs and test the validity of these models.  Because economic models are 
approximations of the true DGP, tests based on such models potentially suffer from 
misspecification.  Misspecification can cause distortions in both the size and power of tests 
of hypotheses and affect parameter estimates and other summary statistics depending on 
the nature and extent of the misspecification. 
The resolution of the CSP presented here comes from noting that the estimates of β 
and λ need not be zero if the EH does not hold.  Campbell and Shiller (1991, p. 500) 
allude to this possibility, but did not pursue it.  The problem can be illustrated easily by 
assuming that long-term and short-term interest rates are generated by independent, 
stationary AR(1) processes.  Given this assumption, it is easy to show that 
1
1 (1/ )[( 1) ]
ˆ (10)
1
k j
j kk
E
θδ
β
δ
−
= −−
=,
+
∑
 
where θ is the autoregressive parameter for the short-term rate and δ is the ratio of the 
variance of the short-term rate to the long-term rate.  Note that  θ
j
j
k
k
=
− ∑ <−
1
1
1, so that (10) 
is strictly positive and increases in both k and δ. 
On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
9 Tzavalis and Wickens (1997) show that when their estimate of the risk premium is added to (6), the 
estimate of β is also insignificantly different from unity. 
10 Bekaert and Hodrick (2001, p. 1358). 
  14ˆ (( )/ )[1/1 ] (11) En m m λδ =− − +  
is strictly negative.  Moreover, the absolute value of E λ increases with k.
11
These results stem from the fact that “the tail is wagging the dog”: the results are 
driven by the fact that   appears with the same sign on both sides of (6) and   appears 
with opposite signs on both sides of (9). 
Rt
m Rt
n
4.1 Generalizing the Bias of these Tests under the Alternative Hypothesis 
The actual results depend on the nature of the true DGP for long-term and short-
term rates.  Hence, it is useful to illustrate the problem more generally.  This is done by 
noting that (4) can be rewritten as 
1
0 (1/ ) ( ) (12)
k mm n m m
tm i t t t t t i kR R R RR αβ β ω
−
+ = ′ −= + − + + , ∑
 
where β β =+′ 1 .  Note that (12) reduces to (6) if and only if  ′ = β 0.  If (12) holds, but (6) 
is estimated, the expected value of the least-square estimator of β  from (6) is 
22
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nm m nm
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ω
βββ
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The second term on the right-hand side of (13) is zero if and only if the EH holds, i.e., 
′ = β 0.  When,  ′ < β 0 (i.e., β <1), the esimate of β will tend to be positive.  It is easy to 
show that 
2
22
ˆ lim (14)
2
nm m
N
nn m m
P
σσ
βββ
σσσ →∞
⎡⎤ − ′ =+ . ⎢⎥ −+ ⎣⎦
 
Noting that  , this expression can be rewritten as  σσ ρ δ nz n /
/ 2 =
1 2
                                                           
11 The expression is slightly more complicated in the case where Rt m
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+
−  does not exist and is replaced by Rt m
n
+ . 
  151/2
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ˆ lim (15)
12 N P
ρδ δ
βββ
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where ρ is the coefficient of correlation between   and  .  The estimate of  Rt
n Rt
m β  depends 
on both the extent to which  ′ β  differs from 0 and the term in brackets, which might be 
called the relative variance factor, rvf.  In general, rvf can be either positive or negative; 
however, it is strictly negative whenever  .  Moreover, it is an increasing function 
of 
ρδ <
−12 /
δ —other things the same, the estimate of β  gets larger, the larger the variance of the 
short-term rate relative to the variance of the long-term rate.  Hence, circumstances can 
easily arise where the estimate of β is positive when the EH does not hold. 
Note that (4) can also be rewritten as 
( /( ))( ) ( / )) (16)
nm n n m n
tm t t t t t RR m n m R R n n m R µβ η
−
+ ′ −= + − − + − + ,  
which reduces to (9) under the null hypothesis if and only if  ′ = β 0.  Moreover, if (9) is 
estimated but (16) holds, 
1/2
1/2
1 ˆ lim 1 ( / ) (17)
12 N Pn m
ρδ
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ρδ δ →∞
⎡⎤ − ′ =+ . ⎢⎥ −+ ⎣⎦
 
Note that the term in brackets is strictly positive under exactly the same circumstances 
where the bracketed term in (15) is strictly negative, i.e., whenever  .  
Consequently, estimates of 
ρδ <
−12 /
λ  will tend to be less than 1 in exactly those circumstances 
where estimates of β  will tend to be greater than zero.  The difference is that the term in 
brackets in (17) is weighted by k , which can be large.  Hence, estimates of λ  can be 
negative. 
  16The extent to which the conventional and contrarian tests generate results 
consistent with the CSP depends on two critical factors—  and  ρδ <
−12 / β  from (6) being 
less than one.  The first condition is generally satisfied because short-term rates tend to be 
more variable than longer-term rates.  Indeed, this is one of the implications of the EH. 
The second condition can be shown to be satisfied whenever the EH does not hold 
exactly for any reason.  To see why, assume that rather than being generated by (1), the 
long-term rate is generated by  
1
0 (1/ ) (18)
k nm
tt t m i t i RkE R Z πϕ
−
+ = =+ + . ∑  
This equation suggests that in addition to the market’s expectation for the short-term rate, 
the long-term rate is determined by other factors, where  t Z  denotes a vector of all other 
factors that determine the long-term rate, and  0 ϕ >  denotes the response of the long-term 
rate to these factors.  Using the same steps used to derive (6) from (1), (18) can be 
rewritten as 
1 *
0 (1/ ) ( ) (19)
k mm n m
tm i t t t t t i kR R R RZ αβ ϕ ω
−
+ = −= + − − + . ∑  
Note that   is conditional on including 
* 1 β = t Z .  If (18) characterizes the DGP, but (6) 
rather than (19) is estimated,  
ˆ lim 1 (20)
N P β
→∞ <.  
This stems from the fact that by (18) 
n
t R  and  t Z  are positively correlated.  Note, however, 
that the same result would be obtained if 
n
t R  and  t Z  were negatively related, i.e., if  
1
0 (1/ ) (21)
k nm
tt t m i t i RkE R Z πϕ
−
+ = =+ − . ∑  
  17The above results illustrate that if the long-term rate is determined by factors other 
than the market’s expectation for the short-term rate, β  implied by (6) will be strictly less 
than 1.  Given the previous result in this subsection, this means that if the EH (equation 1) 
does not hold for any reason—a time-varying risk premium, the overreaction (or 
underreaction) of the long-term rate to changes in expectations for the short-term rate, 
market segmentation, etc.—tests of the EH using (6) and (9) are capable of generating 
results that are consistent with the CSP.  The CSP can result from the facts that (a) the EH 
is not the true DGP processes for the long-term rate and (b) by design these tests can 
generate results that are consistent with the CSP when the EH is not the true DGP, 
whatever the reason. 
It is important to note, however, that this does not necessarily imply that term 
spread is not useful for predicting the short-term rate or the short-term behavior of the 
long-term rate.  Rather, because these tests are derived under a null hypothesis, if the EH is 
not the true DGP for the long-term rate, they need not reflect the predictability of the term 
spread.  To do so, other factors that determine the long-term rate need to be identified and 
included in the specification of the test. 
5. A Monte Carlo Investigation 
In order to examine the extent to which these features of these tests can account for 
Campbell and Shiller’s paradoxical results presented in Section 2, hypothetical “short-
term” and “long-term” interest rates are generated where the EH does not hold, but many 
of the features of the historical data are preserved.  The analysis in the previous section 
shows that the paradoxical results depend in part on the degree to which the EH is violated, 
with the CSP being strongest in cases where observed long-term rate is uncorrelated with 
  18the long-term rate implied by the EH.  This section shows that, in most cases, Campbell 
and Shiller’s results can be obtained using data where the EH cannot hold.  This should not 
necessarily be taken as evidence that the long-term rates are unrelated to the market’s 
expectation of the short-term rate.
12
In any event, to see how these hypothetical long-term and short-term rates are 
obtained, consider the following VAR specification for the long-term and short-term 
interest rates 
1
(22)
L
th t h t
h
xx θε −
=
=+ , ∑  
where  , and  xR R tt
n
t
m = ′ ( , ) ε t  is a 2 by 1 vector of iid independent shocks.  The VAR 
specification is general enough to encompass a wide range of alternative DGPs.  Moreover, 
it is easy to state restrictions on the VAR such that the EH does not hold. 
To see how this is done, note that the EH implies the VAR satisfies the constraint 
1
12 ,
01
1
() 0 ( 2 3 )
kL
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−
==
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where   and e  are elementary vectors that have 1 in the first and second position, 
respectively (e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1987, 1991; Bekaert and Hodrick, 2001).  The 
restrictions implied by (23) are highly nonlinear and can be tested using a LaGrange 
multiplier test (e.g., Bekaert and Hodrick, 2001).  While it is difficult to determine a set of 
necessary conditions such that the EH will not hold, it is easy to show that 
e1 2
θ h,21 0 =  for all 
 is a sufficient condition, i.e.,  h θ h,21 0 ≠  is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
                                                           
12 One possible explanation is that market participants have difficulty forecasting the future short-term rate 
beyond its current level.  Diebold and Li (2003) recently document that many term structure models are 
unable to beat a random walk model at short horizons and only marginally improve on a random walk model 
at longer horizons. 
  19the EH.  This can be seen by noting that with the restriction θ h,21 0 =  for all h, θ h is an 
upper triangular matrix.  The sum and products of upper triangular matrices are upper 
triangular.  Hence, under this assumption, the restriction given by (23) requires 1 , i.e., 
the EH cannot hold. 
0 =
The intuition for this result is straightforward.  The EH indicates that today’s long-
term rate depends on today’s expectation for tomorrow’s short-term rate.  If the EH holds, 
the short-term rate must be correlated with past values of the long-term rate.  Any DGP 
where the short-term rate is independent of past values of the long-term rate is sufficient to 
guarantee that the EH does not hold.  The reverse is not true, however.  The existence of 
this correlation does not establish the EH.  For example, past behavior of long-term rates 
might provide information about the future direction of interest rates—including short-
term rates.  Hence, short-term rates could be correlated with past long-term rates even if 
the EH does not hold. 
5.1 The Monte Carlo Experiment 
To investigate the extent to which the proposed resolution of the CSP accounts for 
the results presented in Section 2, data are generated from (22) imposing the condition that 
θ h,21 0 = .  Specifically, (22) is estimated imposing the condition that θ h,21 0 =  using the 
Campbell and Shiller (1991) data for the period 1952.01 – 1991.02.
13  The VAR was 
estimated for the 48 combinations of long-term and short-term rates where k  is an integer.  
Following Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), the lag length was determined by the Schwartz 
                                                           
13 There were six combinations of n and m for which the VAR was unstable when the restriction was 
imposed.  These cases were (n, m) equal (2,1), (3,1), (4,1), (4,2), (48,24), and (120,60).  In these instances it 
was also necessary to impose the restriction that the long-term rate was independent of lagged values of the 
short-term rate to obtain a stable model. 
  20information criterion.  In all but a few cases the optimal lag length was selected to be 2, so 
the lag length was taken to be 2. 
Ten thousand samples of size 500 and 1000 are generated from the model using an 
iid bootstrap of the residuals obtained from the estimated VAR.  The bootstrap procedure 
preserves the contemporaneous correlation, skewness, and kurtosis in the residuals.  In 
each experiment, the initial 1,000 observations were discarded to minimize the effect of the 
initial conditions.  These data were used to estimate (6) and (9).  In the instances where 
 is not available, the usual procedure of replacing   with   is followed.  In 
cases where   is available and  ,   and   are different, the data are generated 
using a three variable VAR.  The estimated standard errors were obtained using the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure. 
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5.2. The Monte Carlo Results 
As noted earlier, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the EH is that 
coefficients on the lagged long-term rate in the short-term rate equation not equal zero.  In 
every case the restriction that the coefficients on lagged values of the long-term rate in the 
short-term rate equation are zero was rejected at a low significance level.  Hence, the data 
satisfy the necessary conditions for the EH.
14
Despite the fact that the hypothesis θ θ 12 1 22 1 0 ,, = =  is easily rejected for all 
specifications, data generated from the VAR with these restrictions imposed do a 
reasonably good job of characterizing the historical data.  Table 3 reports the mean, 
median, and standard deviations of the actual data and the hypothetical data generated by 
                                                           
14 Dittmar and Thornton (2003) test the restriction given by (23) using these data and the LaGrange multiplier 
test of Bekaert and Hodrick (2001).  These restrictions are rejected at the 5 percent significance level or 
lower for maturity pairing except at the long end of the maturity spectrum. 
  21the VAR models.  The VARs were estimated for all combinations of   and m, such that  n
k  is integer valued; however, the results were relatively insensitive to choice of   and m.  
Hence, to conserve space, only the statistics for m
n
=1 are presented in Table 3. 
As was the case for Bekaert et al. (2001), the means are somewhat larger for the 
model data and the kurtosis is somewhat less than in the U.S. data.  The standard 
deviations are also somewhat smaller, but like the actual data, they tend to be very similar 
for maturities up to about 36 months and then decline.  All in all, the model generates data 
that appear to approximate the historical data reasonably well. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results estimating the conventional test using artificial 
data for sample sizes 500 and 1000, respectively.  Tables 6 and 7 report the analogous 
results for the contrarian test.  The first entry in each cell is the average estimate of the 
parameter (β  or λ ), the second is the range of the parameter estimates, the third is the 
average estimate of  R
2, the fourth is the percentage of times that the null hypothesis that 
the estimated coefficient is zero is rejected, and the fifth is the percentage of times that the 
EH is rejected, i.e., the power of the test. 
The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the estimates of β  are nearly always 
positive.  The estimates are quite small for small values of k , but increase as k  gets larger.  
The range of parameter estimates tends to be large and becomes larger, the larger is k .  
Both the average estimate ofβ  and the range decrease as the sample size increases; 
however, estimates of β appear to decline slowly so that the frequency of rejecting the 
hypothesis β = 0 increases.  The power of the test is very high when the short-term rate is 
less than three years, but generally declines as k increases and is low when n=120.  As 
expected, the power of the test improves as the sample size increases.   
  22The results presented in Tables 6 and 7 show that the estimates of λ  are nearly 
always negative.  Moreover, consistent with the analysis in Section 4, the estimates tend to 
be more negative as k  increases.  As was the case for the conventional test, the absolute 
value of the estimates of λ decline as the sample size increases, albeit slowly.  Hence, even 
for samples of 1000, negative estimates of λ less than -1 are common.  The power of the 
test is very high for all interest rate pairs, save those with long maturities, and increases 
with the sample size. 
These results show that the conventional and contrarian tests tend to generate 
results that are consistent with the CSP when the EH does not hold: estimates of β  are 
nearly always positive, while estimates of λ  are nearly always negative. 
To assess the extent to which the explanation advanced in Section 4 accounts for 
the CSP, Tables 8 and 9 report the probably that the parameter estimates obtained with 
actual data could have been generated by a DGP where the EH does not hold.  Specifically, 
the probabilities 1−≤ − Pr(~ | |) ϕ ϕ ϕ  are reported, where ~ ϕ  is an estimate of ϕ  (β  or λ ) 
obtained from the hypothetical data, ϕ  is the mean estimate of these parameters obtained 
from the Monte Carlo experiments, and   ϕ  is the estimate of these parameters reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
These results are reported only for sample size 500 because this sample size more 
nearly matches the sample sizes used to generate the results in Tables 1 and 2.
15  All of the 
instances where 1−≤ − Pr(~ | |) ϕ ϕ ϕ  is greater than or equal to 5 percent are highlighted. 
This resolution of the CSP does a better job accounting for the smirk than the smile.  This 
is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, which present the smile (for m=1) obtained from Tables 1 
                                                           
15 The largest sample size is 469 observations. 
  23and 4, respectively, and the smirk obtained from Tables 2 and 6, respectively.  It is clear 
from Figure 3 that this resolution of the CSP does not account for estimates of β when the 
short-term rate has a maturity of 9 months or less.  It also does not account for estimates of 
β when the long-term rate has a maturity of 120 months.  In both cases, estimates of β 
from the hypothetical data are too small relative to the estimates obtained using historical 
data. 
Despite these limitations, using a 5 percent significance level as the criterion, the 
resolution of the CSP presented here accounts for the results for 34 of the 48 estimates of 
β reported in Table 1 and for 40 of the 48 estimates of λ in Table 2.  Hence, with 
relatively few exceptions, the Monte Carlo experiments show that the explanation 
advanced in Section 2 resolves the CSP. 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure asserts that long-term rates are 
determined by the market’s expectation of the short-term rate over the holding period of 
the long-term rate plus a constant risk premium.  One of the most puzzling results in this 
literature is the CSP—the fact that regressions of the long-term change in the short-term 
rate on the spread between the long-term and short-term rates generate results that are 
favorable to the EH in that the term spread predicts the correct direction of the future 
change in the short-term rate, while an equivalent test under the null hypothesis that 
regresses short-term changes in the long-term rate on the term spread generates results that 
are unfavorable to the EH in that the term spread predicts the wrong direction of the 
change in the long-term rate. 
  24Previous attempts to resolve the CSP have met with limited success.  Researchers 
have only been able to account for the CSP using statistical models that are flexible enough 
to capture the observed variation in the term premiums in the data.  The resolution offered 
here is based on the observation that these tests tend to generate results consistent with the 
CSP when the EH does not represent the true data generating process for the long-term 
rate.  This tendency arises from the fact that, for one test, the current-period short-term rate 
appears symmetrically on both sides of the equation, while for the other test, the current 
long-term rate appears on both sides of the equation with opposite signs.  Consequently, 
for the one test the slope coefficient will be biased toward 1 when the EH does not hold, 
while for the other test the estimated slope coefficient may be negative. 
Monte Carlo experiments show that this explanation goes a long way toward 
resolving the CSP.  For most combinations of the long-term and short-term rates, the 
results from these tests using historical data could have been generated by applying these 
tests to data for which the EH does not hold.  
There are several implications of these results.  The first is that there is really no 
paradox.  By their design these tests tend to generate results consistent with the CSP when 
the EH does not hold.  Given the widespread failure of the EH, the proposition that the EH 
does not hold can hardly be considered controversial.  While analysts are understandably 
interested in knowing exactly why the EH does not hold, the fact that it does not hold is 
sufficient to account for most of Campbell and Shiller’s (1991) paradoxical results. 
A second implication is that the magnitude of the estimated slope coefficients and 
the adjusted R-squares from these tests are not useful for assessing the validity of the EH 
when the EH is rejected by these tests. Given that the estimates from the contrarian test 
  25were frequently negative, this has long been assumed to be true of it.  The analysis 
presented here shows that this conclusion is equally true for the conventional test.  This is 
important because the size of the estimated slope coefficient from the contrarian test and 
the size of the adjusted R-square have been used an indicator of the potential validity of the 
EH, even when the EH is rejected.  This implication is made more important by the fact 
that similar tests are used to test other important financial theories. 
A third implication comes from combining the results of Bekaert et al. (2001) with 
the results presented here.  Bekaert et al. demonstrate that the conventional and contrarian 
tests of the EH are severely positively biased in small samples when the EH holds.  This 
bias is due to the extreme persistence in the short-term rate under the null hypothesis and 
remains even in a relatively large sample. As a result, they find that the evidence against 
the EH is much stronger using their small-sample distributions than the asymptotic 
distributions. The analysis presented here complements this work by showing that these 
tests are biased in the direction of the CSP when the EH does not hold.  As in Bekaert et 
al., (1997), these biases remain relatively severe even in very large samples. 
Fourth, because the estimated coefficients of these equations can be severely biased 
away from their theoretical values under both the null and the alternative hypotheses, 
researchers might do well to consider alternative procedures for testing the EH.  One such 
procedure would be to test the EH by estimating a general VAR for interest rates and 
imposing the restrictions imposed by the EH.  This procedure was proposed by Campbell 
and Shiller (1987) and has recently been made operational by Bekaert and Hodrick (2001). 
This test is less sensitive to the bias noted by Bekaert et al. (1997), and, because VARs are 
able to capture comovements among rates that cannot be captured in single equations, this 
  26test should be more powerful than the conventional and contrarian tests derived under the 
null hypothesis.  Moreover, this methodology is easily extended to models of more than 
two interest rates or that include other economic variables, such as output and inflation, 
and can be applied under the assumption that interest rates are stationary or integrated of 
order one, but cointegrated (e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1987; Dittmar and Thornton, 
2003). 
Finally, the results here show that the CSP does not necessarily have implications 
for the predictive power of the term spread for either long-term changes in the short-term 
rate or short-term changes in the long-term rate.  Rather, they suggest that if the EH does 
not represent the true DGP for the long-term rate, the predictive power of the term spread 
can be identified only if the other factors that determine the long-term rate are identified 
and included in the specification of the test. 
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n/m  1 2 3 4 6 9  12  24  60 
2  0 . 5 0 2           
  0 . 1 0 7           
  5 . 2 4 7           
  5 . 2 1 3           
3  0 . 4 6 7           
  0 . 0 8 3           
  3 . 1 6 6           
  3 . 6 0 7           
4  0.471  0.224         
  0.073  0.008         
  2.484  0.926         
  2.795  3.217         
6  0.320  0.087  -0.075        
  0.031  0.000  -0.001        
  2.190  0.574  0.414        
  4.656  5.988  5.906        
9  0.254    0.061        
  0.019    -0.001        
  1.649    0.432        
  4.842    6.602        
12  0.272 0.157 0.114 0.023 0.093         
  0.022  0.005  0.001  -0.002  -0.001      
  1.308 0.852 0.629 0.128 0.308         
  3.497 4.583 4.897 5.423 2.992         
24  0.363 0.337 0.318 0.280 0.238    0.089     
  0.038 0.029 0.024 0.016 0.010    -0.001     
  1.632 1.523 1.321 1.038 0.748    0.252     
  2.858 2.992 2.839 2.667 2.398    2.590     
36  0.401 0.428 0.426 0.404 0.369 0.283 0.209     
  0.048 0.050 0.046 0.039 0.030 0.016 0.006     
  1.422 1.500 1.465 1.318 1.123 0.774 0.492     
  2.129 2.006 1.974 1.945 1.924 1.959 1.860     
48  0.443 0.505 0.522 0.515 0.505    0.375 0.090   
  0.055 0.068 0.069 0.064 0.059    0.025 -0.001   
  1.151 1.339 1.436 1.436 1.482    1.150 0.150   
  1.450 1.312 1.314 1.353 1.452    1.919 1.523   
60  0.511 0.583 0.607 0.607 0.612    0.558     
  0.076 0.095 0.097 0.092 0.089    0.059     
  1.230 1.387 1.461 1.473 1.594    1.845     
  1.177 0.990 0.946 0.952 1.010    1.462     
120  1.402 1.473 1.507 1.523 1.567    1.618 1.759 2.290 
  0.690 0.721 0.729 0.711 0.687    0.550 0.399 0.196 
  9.552 10.595  10.796  10.316 9.393    8.318  5.899  2.824 
  2.738 3.402 3.633 3.541 3.399    3.178 2.545 1.591  
 
Table 2: Estimates from the Contrarian Test      rr m n m r r
tm i
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t
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n/m  1 2 3 4 6 9  12  24  60 
2  0.003          
  - 0 . 0 0 2           
  0.017          
  5.213          
3  - 0 . 1 4 5           
  - 0 . 0 0 1           
  0.407          
  3.221          
4  -0.346  -0.553         
  0.003  0.013         
  0.644  1.146         
  2.507  3.217         
6  -0.493  -1.124  -1.151        
  0.004  0.038  0.056        
  0.954  2.586  3.160        
  2.890  4.888  5.906        
9  -0.915    -1.465        
  0.009    0.053        
  1.747    3.044        
  3.656    5.121        
12  -1.029  -1.325  -1.728  -1.130  -0.814      
  0.008 0.024 0.055 0.031 0.020         
  1.763 3.306 3.388 2.689 1.342         
  3.475 5.802 5.348 5.069 2.992         
24  -1.448 -1.665 -1.471 -1.259  -0.718  -0.822    
  0.008 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.011    0.024     
  1.875 2.476 2.615 2.676 2.076    1.169     
  3.170 3.963 4.393 4.801 4.965    2.590     
36  -1.890 -1.937 -1.708 -1.465 -0.983 -0.961 -1.134     
  0.011 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.016 0.026 0.035     
  10.053  4.945 6.235 1.713 1.932 1.934 1.492     
  15.372  7.498 9.885 2.882 3.898 3.946 2.808     
48  -2.264 -2.306 -1.973 -1.706  -1.210  -1.426  -0.821  
  0.012 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.020    0.044 0.014   
  2.623 2.860 2.597 2.443 1.884    2.560 0.686   
  3.781 4.100 3.913 3.875 3.440    4.356 1.523   
60  -2.613 -2.621 -2.237 -1.969  -1.462  -1.680    
  0.013 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.024    0.050     
  2.919 2.801 2.905 3.497 4.004    1.637     
  4.036 3.869 4.204 5.273 6.743    2.612     
120  -4.220 -4.068 -3.693 -3.316 -2.629  -2.451  -1.241  3.581 
  0.018 0.032 0.039 0.042 0.038    0.051 0.014 0.129 
  5.504 4.978 3.958 3.759 3.362    4.877 1.553 2.207 
  6.808 6.201 5.030 4.892 4.641    6.867 2.804 1.591 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for U.S. and Model Data 
 Mean  Median  S.D. 
Term U.S. Model U.S. Model U.S. Model 
1  5.31 5.69 4.94 5.73 3.06 2.67 
2  5.51 5.91 5.15 6.00 3.12 2.71 
3  5.64 6.06 5.27 6.14 3.14 2.73 
4  5.74 6.17 5.34 6.22 3.15 2.71 
6  5.88 6.27 5.55 6.32 3.18 2.71 
9  6.00 6.39 5.74 6.44 3.18 2.72 
12  6.08 6.48 5.82 6.52 3.17 2.69 
24  6.27 6.72 6.15 6.76 3.12 2.58 
36  6.39 6.85 6.37 6.87 3.08 2.47 
48  6.47 6.98 6.50 7.00 3.07 2.41 
60  6.53 7.07 6.53 7.09 3.06 2.36 
120 6.68 7.30 6.56 7.32 3.01 2.21 
  3Table 4: Monte Carlo Estimates of the Conventional Test—Sample Size 500
123469 1 2 2 4 6 0
2 0.006
-0.059, 0.065
0.000
0.060
1.000
3 0.014
-0.062, 0.118
0.002
0.098
1.000
4 0.022 0.012
-0.066, 0.142 -0.114, 0.167
0.005 0.001
0.120 0.048
1.000 1.000
6 0.024 -0.020 -0.046
-0.257, 0.317 -0.449, 0.464 -0.589, 0.424
0.005 0.004 0.003
0.078 0.075 0.088
1.000 1.000 1.000
9 0.033 -0.019
-0.352, 0.484 -0.708, 0.641
0.008 0.005
0.084 0.075
1.000 1.000
12 0.063 0.036 0.029 0.027 0.038
-0.374, 0.624 -0.510, 0.644 -0.623, 0.686 -0.623, 0.712 -0.533, 0.716
0.012 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007
0.114 0.083 0.084 0.077 0.071
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.999
24 0.172 0.160 0.155 0.157 0.168 0.109
-0.533, 0.876 -0.656, 0.838 -0.660, 1.029 -0.658, 1.112 -0.626, 0.963 -0.457, 0.821
0.036 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.022
0.285 0.218 0.198 0.195 0.210 0.144
0.998 0.991 0.984 0.977 0.981 0.997
36 0.278 0.270 0.271 0.279 0.292 0.275 0.263
-0.500, 1.040 -0.594, 1.198 -0.696, 1.353 -0.839, 1.212 -0.729, 1.249 -0.555, 1.231 -0.633, 1.314
0.064 0.053 0.049 0.048 0.055 0.059 0.054
0.455 0.379 0.357 0.347 0.377 0.394 0.357
0.971 0.935 0.916 0.888 0.881 0.922 0.915
48 0.352 0.347 0.347 0.361 0.381 0.352 0.263
-0.456, 1.298 -0.615, 1.286 -0.738, 1.360 -0.737, 1.534 -0.588, 1.456 -0.631, 1.489 -0.607, 1.681
0.089 0.076 0.071 0.072 0.083 0.083 0.052
0.544 0.484 0.458 0.465 0.501 0.483 0.326
0.918 0.867 0.837 0.794 0.784 0.827 0.856
60 0.419 0.417 0.418 0.431 0.448 0.432
-0.526, 1.394 -0.679, 1.331 -0.718, 1.411 -0.770, 1.497 -1.022, 1.715 -0.833, 1.620
0.117 0.101 0.095 0.096 0.107 0.110
0.633 0.571 0.550 0.545 0.580 0.581
0.831 0.773 0.742 0.706 0.707 0.736
120 0.625 0.639 0.644 0.657 0.688 0.681 0.643 0.389
-0.586, 1.628 -1.104, 1.718 -1.008, 1.724 -1.033, 1.859 -0.810, 1.708 -0.821, 1.856 -1.016, 2.205 -1.218, 2.370
0.225 0.208 0.201 0.203 0.227 0.233 0.214 0.117
0.816 0.784 0.761 0.764 0.797 0.788 0.739 0.526
0.518 0.456 0.430 0.410 0.385 0.447 0.516 0.707
 Table 5: Monte Carlo Estimates of the Conventional Test—Sample Size 1000
123469 1 2 2 4 6 0
2 0.005
-0.027, 0.042
0.000
0.063
1.000
3 0.012
-0.037, 0.065
0.002
0.137
1.000
4 0.018 0.010
-0.046, 0.087 -0.068, 0.106
0.003 0.001
0.164 0.041
1.000 1.000
6 0.022 -0.021 -0.044
-0.158, 0.217 -0.305, 0.278 -0.415, 0.320
0.003 0.002 0.002
0.080 0.065 0.091
1.000 1.000 1.000
9 0.030 -0.019
-0.268, 0.321 -0.443, 0.587
0.004 0.003
0.076 0.066
1.000 1.000
12 0.059 0.033 0.027 0.022 0.036
-0.255, 0.375 -0.398, 0.473 -0.484, 0.557 -0.475, 0.506 -0.390, 0.529
0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004
0.119 0.075 0.071 0.069 0.076
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
24 0.164 0.152 0.148 0.149 0.156 0.092
-0.267, 0.610 -0.453, 0.686 -0.344, 0.744 -0.412, 0.779 -0.360, 0.677 -0.248, 0.552
0.026 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.014
0.370 0.264 0.236 0.229 0.251 0.152
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
36 0.260 0.256 0.256 0.262 0.272 0.248 0.221
-0.291, 0.792 -0.472, 0.867 -0.396, 0.948 -0.445, 0.920 -0.383, 0.942 -0.295, 0.986 -0.233, 1.019
0.049 0.039 0.036 0.035 0.041 0.043 0.037
0.578 0.476 0.436 0.430 0.469 0.477 0.410
1.000 0.998 0.994 0.991 0.991 0.996 0.996
48 0.333 0.330 0.331 0.339 0.353 0.306 0.204
-0.167, 0.949 -0.275, 0.975 -0.377, 1.010 -0.413, 1.007 -0.381, 1.096 -0.282, 1.040 -0.434, 1.090
0.071 0.059 0.055 0.054 0.063 0.059 0.031
0.704 0.615 0.580 0.578 0.616 0.573 0.326
0.996 0.986 0.979 0.969 0.957 0.976 0.986
60 0.395 0.395 0.399 0.404 0.421 0.383
-0.366, 0.974 -0.527, 1.108 -0.352, 1.113 -0.385, 1.114 -0.327, 1.132 -0.281, 1.260
0.093 0.080 0.075 0.074 0.085 0.082
0.781 0.712 0.690 0.674 0.724 0.685
0.983 0.959 0.941 0.919 0.917 0.930
120 0.588 0.602 0.606 0.613 0.640 0.615 0.536 0.279
-0.259, 1.248 -0.297, 1.392 -0.260, 1.276 -0.370, 1.355 -0.431, 1.324 -0.303, 1.560 -0.399, 1.585 -0.646, 1.569
0.182 0.167 0.159 0.158 0.181 0.179 0.150 0.064
0.933 0.911 0.891 0.883 0.910 0.890 0.803 0.491
0.791 0.698 0.656 0.628 0.596 0.644 0.733 0.917
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Table 6: Monte Carlo Estimates of the Contrarian Test—Sample Size 500
123469 1 2 2 4 6 0
2 -0.019
-0.153, 0.073
0.001
0.094
1.000
3 -0.641
-1.070, -0.206
0.373
1.000
1.000
4 -0.390 -0.032
-1.080, 0.285 -0.315, 0.203
0.122 0.002
0.910 0.067
1.000 1.000
6 -0.522 -0.209 -0.804
-1.186, 0.023 -1.755, 2.048 -1.934, 0.130
0.029 0.009 0.044
0.941 0.137 0.857
1.000 0.786 1.000
9 -1.050 -1.726
-2.171, -0.149 -3.343, -0.213
0.043 0.106
0.987 0.991
1.000 1.000
12 -1.178 -1.385 -2.315 -1.381 -0.766
-2.416, -0.066 -2.762, -0.021 -4.010, -0.690 -2.855, 0.102 -1.901, 0.534
0.041 0.060 0.158 0.076 0.058
0.985 0.966 0.999 0.928 0.720
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999
24 -1.566 -1.742 -1.811 -1.657 -0.983 -0.134
-3.344, 0.043 -3.991, 0.021 -4.029, 0.360 -4.227, 0.501 -2.624, 1.067 -1.255, 1.105
0.034 0.054 0.072 0.074 0.058 0.020
0.966 0.954 0.942 0.896 0.648 0.128
1.000 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.988 0.980
36 -1.936 -2.014 -1.982 -1.751 -1.025 -0.459 -0.422
-4.375, -0.097 -4.417, 0.034 -4.411, 0.412 -4.103, 1.069 -3.485, 1.365 -2.421, 1.443 -2.684, 2.020
0.033 0.051 0.064 0.063 0.045 0.029 0.038
0.967 0.939 0.911 0.829 0.508 0.236 0.265
1.000 0.998 0.995 0.987 0.949 0.902 0.850
48 -2.310 -2.383 -2.310 -2.033 -1.260 -0.521 0.040
-4.870, 0.551 -4.971, 0.407 -5.163, 0.280 -4.848, 0.933 -3.772, 1.536 -3.195, 2.365 -1.841, 2.237
0.034 0.055 0.068 0.067 0.051 0.037 0.032
0.969 0.952 0.925 0.847 0.564 0.263 0.191
0.999 0.997 0.995 0.986 0.938 0.821 0.757
60 -2.652 -2.700 -2.587 -2.305 -1.524 -0.609
-5.436, -0.261 -5.393, -0.020 -6.081, 0.464 -5.351, 1.751 -4.662, 1.515 -3.063, 2.298
0.035 0.058 0.071 0.072 0.059 0.037
0.975 0.964 0.930 0.865 0.635 0.277
0.999 0.997 0.994 0.985 0.940 0.776
120 -4.255 -4.163 -3.952 -3.540 -2.542 -1.307 -0.339 0.014
-8.940, 0.153 -8.559, -0.207 -8.227, 0.592 -7.621, 0.886 -6.010, 2.404 -5.218, 3.622 -3.750, 3.898 -3.117, 3.414
0.042 0.067 0.083 0.086 0.078 0.057 0.042 0.081
0.991 0.977 0.959 0.910 0.735 0.435 0.262 0.408
0.999 0.997 0.994 0.980 0.928 0.776 0.603 0.690
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Table 7: Monte Carlo Estimates of the Contrarian Test—Sample Size 1000
123469 1 2 2 4 6 0
2 -0.016
-0.085, 0.037
0.001
0.121
1.000
3 -0.641
-0.990, -0.332
0.393
1.000
1.000
4 -0.387 -0.029
-0.907, 0.059 -0.193, 0.131
0.122 0.001
0.983 0.074
1.000 1.000
6 -0.512 -0.136 -0.795
-0.928, -0.177 -1.311, 1.660 -1.516, -0.088
0.028 0.005 0.042
0.998 0.121 0.982
1.000 0.899 1.000
9 -1.036 -1.720
-1.811, -0.456 -2.891, -0.456
0.043 0.105
1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
12 -1.160 -1.372 -2.308 -1.379 -0.762
-1.928, -0.454 -2.362, -0.510 -3.637, -1.147 -2.408, -0.368 -1.528, 0.102
0.040 0.059 0.157 0.075 0.055
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.929
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
24 -1.534 -1.714 -1.777 -1.638 -0.972 -0.128
-2.659, -0.407 -3.290, -0.386 -3.282, -0.420 -3.040, -0.299 -2.148, 0.248 -0.876, 0.609
0.033 0.053 0.069 0.072 0.054 0.012
1.000 0.999 0.998 0.992 0.894 0.128
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
36 -1.898 -1.982 -1.952 -1.730 -1.014 -0.456 -0.454
-3.447, -0.531 -3.421, -0.446 -3.598, -0.276 -3.439, 0.091 -2.614, 0.393 -1.655, 0.900 -1.814, 1.161
0.032 0.050 0.062 0.060 0.041 0.023 0.031
0.999 0.998 0.994 0.979 0.779 0.350 0.376
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.995 0.984
48 -2.263 -2.346 -2.273 -2.007 -1.252 -0.533 -0.007
-4.013, -0.748 -4.304, -0.539 -3.907, -0.371 -3.953, -0.108 -3.171, 0.340 -1.926, 1.002 -1.199, 1.358
0.033 0.054 0.066 0.065 0.048 0.029 0.014
0.999 0.999 0.996 0.984 0.825 0.364 0.125
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.972 0.946
60 -2.600 -2.649 -2.561 -2.274 -1.499 -0.618
-4.728, -0.971 -4.469, -0.912 -4.599, -0.622 -4.540, 0.377 -3.878, 0.351 -2.192, 1.241
0.035 0.056 0.069 0.070 0.055 0.029
1.000 0.999 0.998 0.986 0.887 0.370
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.952
120 -4.180 -4.102 -3.894 -3.498 -2.535 -1.324 -0.406 -0.061
-6.890, -1.583 -6.911, -0.495 -6.790, -0.917 -6.311, -0.747 -5.237, 0.399 -3.712, 1.116 -2.309, 2.250 -1.812, 2.328
0.041 0.066 0.081 0.084 0.075 0.050 0.026 0.037
1.000 1.000 0.999 0.995 0.945 0.634 0.261 0.315
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.956 0.813 0.881
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Table 8: Probability Estimates of β Came From Hypothetical Data 
n\m  1 2 3 4 6 9  12  24  60 
2  .000          
3  .000          
4  .000  .000         
6 .008  .314  .821        
9 .034    .608        
12  .080  .434  .610  .983  .724      
24  .267  .360  .437  .575  .732  .886    
36  .557  .496  .528  .630  .767  .971  .831    
48  .700  .536  .514  .593  .675  .935  .550  
60  .716  .549  .510  .555  .592  .691    
120 .008 .009 .010 .012 .011    .011 .007 .000 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Probability Estimates of λ Came From the Hypothetical Data 
n\m  1 2 3 4 6 9  12  24  60 
2  .326          
3  .004          
4  .000  .000         
6  .837  .067  .196        
9  .567  .730        
12  .590  .865  .489  .524  .876      
24  .768  .865  .490  .434  .529  .014    
36  .927  .885  .634  .629  .939  .441 .019     
48  .935  .902  .613  .618  .936  .033  .071  
60  .951  .910  .625  .645  .925  .048    
120  0.972  0.924  0.797  0.827  0.931  0.205  0.308 0.000 
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Figure 2: The Smirk 
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 Figure 3: The Smile
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Experimental Data
 
Figure 4: The Smirk
-4.5
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
2 3 4 6 9 1 22 43 64 86 0 1 2 0
Maturity of the Long-term Rate in Months
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
S
l
o
p
e
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
e
q
.
 
9
Historical data
Experimental data
 
 
 
 
  2